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Search Engine Advertising: Pricing Ads to Context 
 
Abstract 
Each search term put into a search engine produces a separate set of results. Correspondingly, 
each of the sets of ads displayed alongside these results is priced using a separate auction. There 
is growing debate whether this marketing strategy merely makes advertising more informative, 
or whether using context to price also effectively price discriminates. To inform this debate, we 
examine advertising prices paid by lawyers for 174 Google search terms in 195 locations and 
exploit a natural experiment in “ambulance-chaser” regulations across states. Where state laws 
impose limits on lawyers’ contingency fees limits, the relative price of advertising is $2.27 
lower. This suggests that context-based pricing allows prices to reflect heterogeneity in the 
profitability of customer leads. When lawyers cannot contact a client by mail, the relative price 
per ad click is $0.93 higher. This suggests that context-based pricing allows prices to reflect 
heterogeneity in advertisers’ other advertising options, even within a given local market. This 
last result emphasizes that search engine’s pricing clout depends on the extent of competition, 
both online and offline.   
 
Keywords: Search Engines, Advertising Prices, Two-Sided Networks, E-commerce, Internet 
Marketing  
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1. Introduction 
In 1998 Goto.com introduced1 two novel features to search advertising markets that had 
not been tried before in other advertising markets:  (1) The use of electronic auctions and (2) the 
ability to provide and price advertisements based on search terms or “keywords”. The practical 
implications are as follows.  A personal injury lawyer and an immigration lawyer decide to 
advertise their services. Using normal media channels, like newspapers, magazines, Yellow 
Pages or a banner ad on a website, they would pay the same price, given the advertisement’s 
physical size, placement and the audience size and demographics. If they used Google, though, 
which uses a similar system to the one pioneered by Goto.com, it would be a different story. The 
personal injury lawyer, after placing a bid online, would pay on average $26.18 every time 
someone clicked on her ad alongside a search for “personal injury lawyer”. However, the 
immigration lawyer using Google would have to pay on average only $7.48 per click for the 
same sized ad, displayed alongside a search for “immigration lawyer”.  
So far, the academic literature on search-engine ad pricing has focused on developing 
models of quality-adjusted second-price auctions for multiple advertising slots. Theoretically 
these auctions could be run on many bases, not just which results are displayed with the ad. 
These might include advertiser characteristics, the timing of the ad, estimated demographics, or 
past-customer behavior. Therefore, prior research does not illuminate the effects of running 
auctions by ad context.  In recent Senate testimony, Google has argued that the main motivation 
behind separate sets of ads (and ad prices) for separate search terms is to enhance the experience 
for the customer, by increasing the usefulness of its ads relative to the search term entered.  
 
                                                 
1Goto.com was renamed Overture in 2001 and purchased by Yahoo in 2003. Prior to this time, search engine ads 
were priced by impressions and demographics.  
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“Simply put, advertising is information, and relevant advertising is information that is 
useful to consumers. The advertising we deliver to our users complements the natural 
search results that we provide, because our users are often searching for products and 
services that our advertisers offer.” 
David Drummond, Google Senior VP for Corporate Development, before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee [September 27, 2007] 
 
We ask in this paper whether there are other motivations for context-based ad pricing 
than mentioned in this passage. Namely, do search engines use “context-based” ad pricing not 
only to deliver a better user experience but also directly to extract higher rents from advertisers 
through finer price discrimination?  
To explore whether context-based pricing facilitates price discrimination, we empirically 
evaluate whether context-based prices reflect heterogeneity in the profitability of customer leads 
and availability of outside options. The latter is of interest because the use of auctions has 
clouded the issue of whether outside advertising options matter. For example, a recent Economist 
article claimed that “the price that Google charges its advertisers is set by auction, so its 
monopolistic clout is limited” (Economist 2007). In the light of this confusion, a second 
contribution of our paper is to document how the extent of media platform competition affects 
the final price of search ads. Ultimately, our results emphasize that media platform market power 
is not decreased by the use of auctions.  This is a pressing question given proposed consolidation 
in media platform markets: antitrust authorities need to understand how much different media 
platforms are able to compete.  
However, we face the identification challenge that advertising demand (variation in 
profitability customer leads) and advertising market structure (the availability of outside 
advertising options) are endogenous to underlying marketing conditions. This means they are 
confounded. One empirical approach would be to conduct an experiment, where we randomly 
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make some customers unreachable by alternative advertising platforms; make other customers 
less profitable; and evaluate whether context-based ad prices reflect these different conditions. In 
the absence of such a randomized field experiment, we identified a similar “natural experiment” 
in advertising for lawyer services, a sector that has annual revenues of over $40 billion.  
This natural experiment exploits differences in how states regulate lawyers in personal 
injury and wrongful death suits in order to dissuade unseemly “ambulance-chaser” behavior. We 
exploit differences in state regulations over contingency fee limits and State Bar solicitation 
regulations that limit whether lawyers can contact clients by mail.2 Solicitation regulations 
decrease the availability of alternative advertising venues for lawyers, while contingency fee 
limits affect the profitability of client leads. To investigate the effect of this exogenous variation 
in competition and advertising demand, we use Google’s estimates of the price range for ads and 
a difference-in-difference identification strategy. The prices are associated with 174 different 
searches for various legal service “keywords” in 195 regional city markets. We regress a 
keyword’s estimated price per click on fixed effects for each location and keyword, and an 
indicator variable for whether the keyword is affected by state regulations.  
We find that prices for personal injury keywords in states with contingency fee limits are 
$2.27 (roughly 17%) lower than other unaffected keywords in that state, relative to price 
premiums for personal injury keywords in unregulated states. This implies that context-based ad 
pricing reflects differences in the profitability of customer leads.  
We find that in locations with solicitation regulations, injury keywords cost advertisers an 
extra $0.93 (roughly 7%) relative to the price of other keywords (such as “tax lawyer”) in that 
state, compared with the price premium of personal injury keywords in non-regulated states. This 
                                                 
2 It is almost always forbidden for lawyers to contact such potential clients in person, including through telephone or 
electronic communication. 
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suggests that when advertisers cannot reach customers through alternative advertising platforms, 
context-based ad pricing allows search engines to charge more. This implied substitutability of 
online and offline advertising suggests that when policy makers or market analysts seek to define 
advertising markets, they should consider both online and offline channels in their market 
definitions. 
These results inform the growing debate on the role of context-based ad pricing, by 
emphasizing that while it may make advertising more useful to users, it also allows media 
platforms to extract high rents from advertisers if there are fewer outside advertising options or 
customer leads are more profitable. This suggests that despite the use of auctions, search engines 
do have monopolistic pricing clout. The sensitivity pricing to offline media channels, however, 
suggests that when evaluating proposed media platform consolidation, the market definitions for 
this industry should consider both offline and online media channels as substitutes.   
2. Related Literature 
Our paper examines the extent to which context-based ad pricing in media platforms 
permits price discrimination. We build on four distinct literatures: (1) two-sided advertising 
markets, (2) online advertising, (3) online/offline substitution, and (4) marketing of legal 
services. 
Previous research on two-sided media platforms, such as search engines, has modeled the 
use of content to attract customers and consequently advertisers (Anderson and Gabszewicz 
2005; Xie and Chen 2007). However, this literature focuses on the use of content to entice 
customers when there is a fixed advertising price, rather than exploring the possibility that 
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content could also be used to price-discriminate between advertisers.3 The empirical literature 
has echoed this focus when studying traditional media-platforms. Wilbur (2007) has shown how 
the effect of context (or program type) on television advertising prices is dwarfed by the effects 
of demographics and the size of the audience reached. Busse and Rysman (2005) document how 
Yellow Pages use ad size rather than ad context as a price discrimination tool. By contrast, this 
paper emphasizes that content is not only a draw for consumers, but can also be used as a way of 
implementing price discrimination for advertisers.   
Our empirical focus on the use of content to discriminate between different advertisers 
with different willingness to pay illuminates a nascent theoretical literature on the potential 
benefits of “targeting” advertising. Work by Iyer, Soberman, and Villas-Boas (2005) 
demonstrates the theoretical advantages that such targeting has for firms, while Gal-Or and Gal-
Or (2005) use the example of customized television advertising to show that better targeting of 
advertisements increases customer welfare. Chen and He (2006) have extended this targeting 
literature to paid search.   
 Our emphasis on search engines using content as a price-segmentation tool contrasts 
with the majority of the literature on search engine ad pricing, that focuses on search engines’ 
use of auctions.4 Pioneering work by Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) showed that 
limiting the number of advertising slots allows search engines to extract higher rents in keyword 
auctions. This focus on generalizing the second-price auction to a multiple-slot format, both in 
theory and empirical literature such as (e.g. Ganchev, et al. 2007) means the authors take the 
                                                 
3 The consequences of such inflexible pricing policies are set out by Baye and Morgan (2001). They show that when 
a media platform sets a fixed advertising fee, this fee will exceed the socially optimal level and many potential 
advertisers will opt out. 
4 An exception is Wilbur and Zhu’s (2007) work on click-fraud.    
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decision to hold a separate auction for each keyword as exogenous.5 We argue that the use of 
auctions to price context, rather than traditional advertising variables such as demographics or ad 
length, is also an important innovation in marketing.  
The empirical literature on search advertising in marketing has focused on the 
performance of different types of keywords for search advertising. For example, Rutz and 
Bucklin (2007) and Ghose and Yang (2007) have shown the effects of different keywords on 
performance and cross-selling opportunities. The rest of the empirical literature on online 
advertising has focused on banner ads and email marketing (such as Manchanda, et al. 2006; 
Chatterjee, Hoffman and Novak 2003; and Ansari and Mela 2003), perhaps because these 
predate keyword advertising.6 Ansari and Mela (2003) find, consistent with Google’s Senate 
testimony, that targeting improves matches and therefore makes consumers and firms better off. 
While this may be true, we find evidence that targeting also allows Google to more effectively 
price discriminate. 
We also add to a growing literature on the relationship between offline and online options 
and marketing outcomes (Jank and Kannan 2006). Forman, Ghose, and Goldfarb (2007) find that 
local retail competition affects online purchasing. Anderson et al (2007) show how high sales tax 
rates lead customers to substitute between remote retail channels and the internet. We add to this 
literature by showing that the benefits of “going online” vary not only for consumers, but also for 
firms making advertising investments. We show that the benefits of advertising through the 
online channel depend on local conditions that affect the profitability of a lead and the level of 
competition in marketing communications.  
                                                 
 
6 The first banner advertisement (for Zima alcoholic beverage) appeared on Wired Magazine’s Hotwired website in 
1994. While OpenText briefly experimented with something like search advertising in 1996, it was not successfully 
implemented until Goto.com applied it in 1998. Prior to the establishment of auctions as the way to price keywords, 
Yahoo charged a fixed rate for banner advertisements placed near popular keywords.  
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Finally, our work is related to an older but substantial marketing literature on legal 
services advertising (Smith and Meyer 1980, Kotler and Connor 1977, Darden, Darden and Kiser 
1981). This literature was inspired by the deregulation of legal services advertising in 1977 and 
examined the consequences from both firm and consumer perspectives of the introduction of 
advertising and marketing by lawyers. We follow in this tradition by studying the relationship 
between regulation and lawyer advertising prices.  
3. Data on Advertising Prices for Lawyer Services 
Since 2002, Google and Yahoo have sold keywords using a second-price sealed bid 
auction as opposed to the less stable first-price auction (Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz 2007). 
However, the nature of the second-price auction obscures how bids translate to prices. An 
advertiser places a bid based on its maximum willingness to pay for an advertisement to appear 
next to a specific search term for a specific geographical location. Google then bills an amount 
that is lower than this maximum price whenever the ad is clicked. However, an advertiser is not 
necessarily paying the second price that was bid in that particular auction. Instead, keyword 
prices post-bidding are adjusted for both the quality of the website buying the keyword, click-
fraud, and the clicks–to-impression ratio, with no information given to advertisers (or 
researchers) about the precise formulas used. In this paper, we use “estimated prices” data for 
Google that abstract from this ex-post quality adjustment.7   
Google provides these estimates to potential clients who use their “Traffic Estimator 
Tool”. This traffic estimator provides (when there are enough data points) a range of prices for 
what other advertisers have paid recently for an advertisement being in positions 1-3 in a certain 
                                                 
7 Google accounts for two-thirds of the search market (October, 2007). 
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location. Therefore, in using data from the Traffic Estimator Tool, we use the exact information 
advertisers use in setting their bid prices. 
Our data come from market research conducted on behalf of a new lawyer portal website. 
This research examined 33,930 keyword-specific ad prices using Google’s Traffic Estimator 
Tool. These projections were for 174 keywords for 195 geographic areas defined by Google to 
closely resemble (consolidated) metropolitan statistical areas. In order to use our natural 
experiment of state-level restrictions, we exclude metropolitan statistical areas that cross state 
lines, like Burlington, VT – Plattsburg, NY and New Bedford, MA – Providence, RI. Our data 
include Google’s estimate of the upper and lower range for the price per click of appearing next 
to a keyword string in positions 1-3. Appendix Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the data 
used in the study. Appendix Table 2 provides a complete list of the keywords used. 
There is a wide range in the average price per click for the different keywords and 
different types of keywords. The lowest priced specialty legal terms are “Money Laundering 
Attorney” and “Food Poisoning Attorney”, at a mean of $0.56 and $0.68 per click respectively 
across locations.8 The highest priced term is “Aviation Accident Attorney” at an average of 
$36.62. Though it is clear that this represents a departure from other media where attorneys 
would all pay the same price for the same space, it is not clear whether these differences are 
being driven by sensitivity to the profitability of customer leads or by differences in market 
competition or something else.    
Prices for a given keyword can vary considerably across cities. Abilene-Sweetwater, TX, 
has the most expensive keyword in the data at $80.17 for “mesothelioma attorney” 
(mesothelioma is an asbestos-related cancer). In contrast, the same keyword string costs just 
                                                 
8 Keyword prices quoted in this section are based on Google’s upper estimate of appearing in positions 1-3. 
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$14.33 in Binghamton, NY. Without empirical analysis, however, it is difficult to know to what 
extent the high price in Abilene-Sweetwater reflects a lack of competition from other media 
platforms, or the average likelihood in Texas relative to New York of obtaining the $2 million 
payout for a typical mesothelioma lawsuit.9  
One challenge of using these price data is that Google gives a price range, but not an 
indication of the distribution of prices paid between these lower and upper cutoffs. Because of 
this, we report results separately for the upper bound and the lower bound of the price estimate. 
We also face a missing data challenge, in that Google reports these ranges only when they have 
enough historical data. In section 5 we discuss in detail how we address these missing data. 
  
4. Variation in Restrictions on Lawyer Behavior 
Trial lawyers earned $40 billion in 2004, an amount that is over 50 percent higher than 
Microsoft or Intel and twice that of Coca-Cola (National Review 2004). The size of this market 
makes studying advertising strategies in this industry independently important. However, for our 
purposes there are two other attractive features of this industry: Differences in state-level bar 
exams keep markets local and there is variation in regulation across states. We use variation in 
two distinct regulations to establish whether context-based ad pricing allows search engines to 
profit from heterogeneity in what other media channels advertisers can use and in the 
profitability of customer leads. Each regulation gives us a natural experiment with a treatment 
group of locations that are affected by the regulation and a control group of locations that are not 
affected. To control for systematic differences between regulated and unregulated states, we 
contrast keyword prices affected by regulation with keyword prices that are unaffected by the 
                                                 
9 Source: www.mesothel.com 
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state regulations in regulated states. Therefore, we estimate how much affected keywords diverge 
in price from unaffected keywords in regulated locations relative to unregulated locations.  
Law firms have only been allowed to advertise nationwide since 1977, when the Supreme 
Court ruled to allow legal advertising in Bates v. the State Bar of Arizona. This case brought to 
an end a state bar association tradition that it was not seemly for lawyers to advertise their 
services in newspapers, on television, or through other channels. This deregulation prompted a 
spate of empirical evaluation by marketing scholars (Smith and Meyer 1980, Kotler and Connor 
1977, Darden, Darden and Kiser 1981) on legal service advertising. However, the notion that 
there are some types of marketing communications that demean the status of the law persists in 
local state bar regulations. In particular, some state bars prohibit lawyers from writing to 
potential clients who have recently sustained an accident or injury.  
A typical text in a state bar manual is found in a section entitled “solicitation”, and reads: 
“A lawyer shall not send, or knowingly permit to be sent, on a lawyer's behalf or on behalf of the lawyer's firm 
or on behalf of a partner, an associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the lawyer's firm, a 
written communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if the 
written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death arising out of, or otherwise 
related to, an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of 
that person, unless the accident or disaster giving rise to the cause of action occurred more than X days before 
the mailing of the communication” 
Table 1 records all instances (as of April 2007) where a state bar prohibited written 
communication to potential clients. There is a little variation over how long the states prohibited 
contact (the mode is 30 days), but the regulations are similar. There was no statistically 
significant relationship between the enactment of a law and the number of lawyers per dollar of 
gross state product, the number of civil suits per capita, state population, or state GDP (Appendix 
Table 3). 
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Table 1: Bar regulations prohibiting contact with clients 
State Personal injury laws/rules 
Alabama No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
Arizona No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
Arkansas No written communication allowed 30 days for wrongful death 
Colorado No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or death 
Connecticut No written communication allowed 40 days for personal injury or death 
Florida No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
Georgia No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
Hawaii No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
Louisiana No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
Missouri No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death (accident or disaster) 
Nevada Must wait 45 days after any known event before written communication 
New York No written communication for 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death unless law says need to file 
in 30 days in which case cannot solicit for 15 days 
South Carolina No written communication allowed 30 days for personal injury or wrongful death 
Tennessee No written communication allowed 30 days for workers’ comp, personal injury, or wrongful death 
Wyoming For written communications, need to wait 30 days after "occurrence" before soliciting a specific client 
 
State bar associations are not the only authority regulating personal injury lawyers. 
Reports that America’s tort system costs up to 2 percent of GDP, and anecdotal evidence that 
excessive litigation has driven up insurance costs, has led some states to impose contingency fee 
limits. 10  A contingency fee is a fee payable only in the case of a favorable result. Lawyers often 
take cases on a contingency fee basis, betting that there will be a large enough payout to make it 
worth their while. This fee structure enables poor clients to afford a lawyer. However, lawyers 
often demand large proportions of the payouts that the courts award in order to compensate 
themselves for the risk. Table 2 displays the contingency fee limits across states based on data 
from the Pacific Research Institute’s “U.S. Tort Liability Index”. While there is substantial 
variation in the laws’ texts, all the laws ultimately limit how profitable it is to represent a 
personal injury client. Since these laws vary more than the solicitation laws in substance, we also 
                                                 
10 The actual costs of the tort system are highly disputed. See the article “Is the Tort System Costing the United 
States $865 Billion a Year?” Richard Posner, Note, Chicago Law School, 2007 
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tried specifications that reflected the Pacific Research Institute’s ranking of the severity of these 
contingency laws, with similar results. We found no statistically significant relationship between 
a law’s enactment and the number of lawyers per dollar gross state product, the number of civil 
suits per capita, or the state’s population, though there was a statistically significant positive 
relationship between contingency fee limits and gross state product per capita (Appendix Table 
3). We control for this difference in states that have contingency fee regulation by focusing on 
the differences in prices between keywords that are likely to be affected by the legislation and a 
baseline of unaffected keywords in that state.  
Table 2: State Laws on Contingency Fees  
Source: Pacific Research Institute  
State Law 
Alaska Requires that contingent fees be calculated exclusive of punitive damages. 
[Alaska Stat. § 9.60.080.] 
Illinois Limits contingent fees to 33.3% of the first $150,000 recovered, 25% of the 
next $850,000 recovered, and 20% of any amount recovered over $1 million. 
[735 Ill. Comp. Stat Ann. § 5/2 –1114.] 
Maine Limits contingent fees in professional liability cases to 33.3% of the first 
$100,000 recovered, 25% of the next $100,000 recovered, and 20% of any 
amount recovered over $2 million. Permits a judge to allow fees in excess of 
these amounts in special circumstances. [Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24 § 2961.] 
Nebraska Allows a court to review contingent fees in medical and professional liability 
cases. [Neb Stat. § 44-2834.] 
Oklahoma Limits contingent fees to 50% of a plaintiff’s recovery. [Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.5, 
§ 7.] 
Wisconsin Limits contingent fees to 1/3 of the first $1 million recovered, 25% of the first 
$1 million recovered if liability is stipulated within 180 days of filing of the 
original complaint and not within 60 days of first day of trial, and 20% for 
amounts exceeding $1 million recovered. Allows a judge to exceed these 
amounts in exceptional circumstances. [Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 655.013.] 
 
 Personal injury keywords can be objectively identified because bar associations uses a 
precise legal definition to define what is a personal injury case and what is not. Personal injury is 
damage to an individual rather than property, and is taken to cover accidents, medical 
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negligence, and industrial diseases contracted by workers at their workplace. The personal injury 
keywords we identified cover regular accidents as well as industrial diseases such as 
mesothelioma where regulations apply after diagnosis or death.11 There are, however, a few 
cases where there may be both personal injury and injury to property in a civil suit. For example 
“toxic mold attorneys” may litigate for both personal injury damages and property damages. We 
tried including and excluding these “combined” civil cases, and achieved qualitatively similar 
results.  
5. Estimation Strategy and Results 
Using data on the prices of keywords across cities, we examine the responsiveness of 
keyword prices to variation in local conditions. Figures 1 and 2 show that there are systematic 
differences in average pricing of keywords across states. Furthermore, descriptive statistics of 
keyword prices across regulatory regimes are suggestive of the regulations having an effect: 
keyword prices are 96 cents lower in states with contingency fee regulation and 28 cents higher 
in states with solicitation regulation. These differences may, however, be a result of 
unobservable differences in willingness to pay across keywords and locations. To control for 
these unobservable differences, we include a series of fixed effects (i.e. dummy variables) for 
each location l and each keyword k and focus on the interaction between whether a keyword 
relates to personal injury and whether there is personal injury regulation in that state. The 
location fixed effects allow us to control for all city-level differences in numbers of lawyers, 
wealth, and litigiousness. The keyword fixed effects allow us to control for all keyword-level 
differences. Therefore, this empirical strategy allows us to control for differences in prices that 
occur because personal injury keywords are different from other keywords, and also differences 
                                                 
11  The keywords, and whether they were categorized as personal injury keywords, are listed in Appendix Table 2. 
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that occur because states that enact personal injury regulation are different from states that don’t; 
this is known as a “differences in differences” approach.12 As long as there is no other systematic 
reason why personal injury keywords should be differently priced to non-personal injury 
keywords in states with regulation, we can interpret the interactions α and β as measuring the 
causal effect of the regulations on prices.  
ܥ݋ݏݐ ݌݁ݎ ܥ݈݅ܿ݇௞௟
ൌ ߙሺܲ݁ݎݏ݋݈݊ܽܫ݆݊ݑݎݕܹ݋ݎ݀௞ሻܺ ሺܵ݋݈݅ܿ݅ݐܽݐ݅݋݊ ܴ݁ݏݐݎ݅ܿݐ݁݀௟ሻ
൅ ߚሺܲ݁ݎݏ݋݈݊ܽܫ݆݊ݑݎݕܹ݋ݎ݀௞ሻܺሺܥ݋݊ݐ݅݊݃݁݊ܿݕܨ݁݁ܮ݅݉݅ݐ௟ሻ
൅ Keyword௞ ൅ ܥ݅ݐݕ௟ ൅ ߝ௞௟ 
          [1] 
We estimate equation [1] using a variety of distributional and specification assumptions. 
Table 3 displays results for our main specification. The estimates for the interactions suggest that 
both solicitation regulations and contingency fee limits affect the prices that lawyers pay for 
personal injury search terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 This use of differences in differences is a similar idea to the specifications used by Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) 
in their study of online book reviews and Busse, Risso and Zettelmeyer (2006) in their study of pass-through of auto 
manufacturer promotions. 
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Table 3: Main Results 
 Dependent variable is price per 
click of ranking first 
Dependent variable is price per 
click of ranking third 
 Robust standard 
errors 
Clustered 
standard errors13
Robust standard 
errors 
Clustered 
standard errors 
     
Personal injury keyword and 
Law restricting solicitation  
 
0.928*** 0.928** 0.731** 0.731*** 
(0.28) (0.36) (0.29) (0.26) 
Personal injury keyword and 
Law restricting contingency fees 
 
-2.273*** -2.273*** -1.860*** -1.860*** 
(0.51) (0.56) (0.48) (0.49) 
Observations 13455 13455 13455 13455 
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.64 0.64 
Standard errors in parentheses 
All regressions include a full set of fixed effects for each city and each keyword.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The presence of a solicitation regulation is associated with a $0.93 increase in the upper 
price for personal injury keyword and a $0.73 increase in price at the lower end. These values are 
economically important relative to average keyword prices of $13.13 and $5.08 for the upper and 
lower end respectively. The significance of these estimates is robust to various specifications of 
the error structure. These results suggest that when state bar regulation makes it harder to contact 
personal injury victims by other marketing communications channels, lawyers are willing to pay 
relatively more for personal injury search advertising keywords. This implies that customizing 
prices based on context allows search engines to charge more when there is a lack of competition 
from other media channels. Furthermore, it suggests that search engines do compete with offline 
marketing communications channels. This may have implications for the way the antitrust 
authorities view future mergers involving media platforms that use context-based pricing.  
State contingency fee limits are associated with a $2.27 decrease in the upper range price 
of personal injury keywords and a $1.86 decrease for the lower range of prices. This result is 
                                                 
13 Errors clustered at the keyword level. 
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again robust to various specifications of the error structure. This suggests that when there are no 
state contingency fee limits to reduce the profitability of lawsuits, context-based ad pricing 
allows search engines to charge higher prices. Thus, these context-based ad prices are extremely 
sensitive to the profitability of the end customer.  
We conducted a number of robustness checks on our results and present the results in 
Appendix Table 4. One concern is that our results are affected by missing data on prices. This 
happens because Google does not report an estimate of prices if there are not enough 
observations of past prices paid for particular keywords. A similar data sparseness issue was 
addressed by Rutz (2007), who uses Bayesian methods to help estimate search word performance 
for hotel search advertising data.14 We ran further regressions to evaluate whether the missing 
data were systematically connected to the type of keyword or to the presence of solicitation 
regulations. We found no statistically significant evidence that they were. This lack of systematic 
correlation and the work of Little (1992) suggests that missing data are not driving our results. In 
addition, we ran Tobit specifications including the missing data that allowed for censoring of 
keyword prices both at the bottom of the observed range and the top of the observed range. The 
results, reported in Appendix Table 4 are similar to those reported in Table 3, although 
significance disappears for solicitation restrictions in the case where the missing values are 
assumed to be at the top of the observed range. 
We also checked different definitions of the dependent and independent variables (shown 
in Appendix Table 4). For the dependent variable, we used log values of the price per click to 
ensure that our results hold for both percentage changes and for levels. All results are robust to 
this specification. For the independent variables, we wanted to verify that it was not an 
                                                 
14 Unfortunately for our purposes, Google has not embraced this methodology. 
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idiosyncratic definition of “personal injury keyword” that led to our results. To allow for a 
broader definition of personal injury, we also tried a definition including “any violation of an 
individual's right, other than his or her rights in property”. This added the keywords associated 
with “dog bites”, “mold”, “toxic mold”, “premises liability”, “food poisoning” and “nursing 
home abuse” to the treatment group. The results were qualitatively similar. 
Correspondingly, we were concerned our control keywords could be affected by 
contingency fee limits or solicitation regulations. This was a particular concern for keywords 
such as “Vioxx lawyer” or “Accutane attorney” that were associated with medical product class-
action lawsuits. To ensure that these factors were not affecting our results, we also ran a more 
limited regression that used only the non-specialty keywords in Appendix Table 2 as controls. 
The results (shown in Appendix Table 4) are qualitatively the same as the main results.  
6. Conclusion 
There is a growing policy debate over whether the current search engine sales strategy of 
running a different set of ads and pricing these ads separately for each different search result, is 
designed merely to make advertising for customers more informative, or whether it is also an 
effective tool for extracting rents from advertisers. To shed light on this debate, we examine 
whether context-based pricing allows search engines to charge prices that reflect differences in 
the number of competing media channels that advertisers face and also differences in the 
profitability of client leads. Our research therefore departs both from existing studies of two-
sided markets that focus on how content attracts customers when advertising prices are fixed, 
and also from the search engine advertising literature that has focused on modeling quality-
adjusted second price auctions but takes the decision to price based on search result as being 
exogenously given. 
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There is an identification challenge in teasing apart demand from supply, given their 
endogeneity to unobserved market conditions. Therefore, we exploit cross-state variation in 
ambulance-chaser regulations. These regulations affect whether lawyers can contact clients by 
using alternative media, and whether there are contingency fee limits that affect the expected 
profitability of each client. When lawyers are not allowed to contact a personal injury or 
wrongful death client by mail, the relative price of a personal injury keyword is $0.93 higher. 
When there are contingency fee limits, the relative price of a personal injury advertisement is 
$2.27 lower. This is evidence that, in addition to making advertising more informative, context-
based ad pricing allows search engines to extract rents when customers are more profitable and 
market competition is lower.15 Furthermore, it suggests that online context-based advertising 
competes in a broader advertising market that includes offline marketing communications 
channels.  
There are both managerial and policy implications to this research. From a managerial 
perspective, our results suggest that context-based pricing is an effective marketing strategy for 
extracting rents from advertisers. The academic literature has focused on the auction mechanism 
used in search engine advertising, but it is the combination of context-based pricing with an 
electronic auction mechanism that is crucial. It is therefore not clear that extending electronic 
auctions to other advertising networks without context-based advertising in place will necessarily 
be profitable. For example, it is not clear that Google’s plans to bring online auctions to TV 
advertising and conduct these auctions on the basis of “daypart, geography and […] 
demographic”, will prove as successful as its prior online search auctions that are conducted 
using context-based pricing.  
                                                 
15 This result is useful for academics studying sectors where it is hard to obtain profitability information, in that 
researchers could use search engine keyword pricing as a guide to relative profitability of a customer.  
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Our research also sheds light on a growing policy debate about the welfare effects of 
displaying a different set of ads (with a different set of prices) for each set of search results. 
Though there may be consumer-welfare benefits, our research suggests context-based pricing 
also allows media platforms to extract rents effectively from advertisers. We leave it to future 
theoretical research explicitly to model the welfare trade-offs between improving the utility of 
advertising to consumers and extracting rents from advertisers. Our results also show that the 
online and offline marketing communications channels compete. These considerations will be 
critical for antitrust authorities when evaluating future industry consolidation across media 
platforms.  
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Appendix  
Appendix Table 1 
Variable # of 
Observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
CPC upper bound 13455 13.13 10.42 0 80.17 
CPC lower bound 13455 5.08 6.96 0 63.44 
Personal Injury Keyword 33733 0.150 0.357 0 1 
Law restricting contingency fees 33733 0.103 0.303 0 1 
Law restricting solicitation 33733 0.303 0.459 0 1 
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Appendix Table 2: List of Keywords 
Personal Injury 
Keywords Other Keywords
 
Medical Malpractice Lawyer Child Support Attorney Tenant Lawyer Baycol Attorney
Personal Injury Attorney Child Abuse Attorney Arson Lawyer Bextra Lawyer
Car Accident Attorney Computer Crime Lawyer Shoplifting Lawyer Prempro Lawyer
Truck Accident Attorney Sexual Assault Attorney Benzene Lawyer Celebrex Attorney
Asbestos Lawyer Insurance Fraud Attorney Forgery Attorney Contract Attorney
Brain Injury Lawyer Prenuptial Attorney Extortion Attorney Baycol Lawyer 
Car Accident Lawyer Living Will Lawyer Extortion Lawyer Serzone Attorney
Brain Injury Attorney Money Laundering Lawyer Perjury Lawyer Crestor Lawyer
Wrongful Death Attorney Traffic Violation Lawyer Adoption Attorney Meridia Attorney
Wrongful Death Lawyer Computer Crime Attorney Robbery Lawyer Ephedra Lawyer
Personal Injury Lawyer Child Support Lawyer Perjury Attorney Fosamax Lawyer
Mesothelioma Lawyer Living Will Attorney Meridia Lawyer Zyprexa Lawyer
Aviation Accident Attorney Credit Card Fraud Lawyer Toxic Mold Lawyer Tax Lawyer
Truck Accident Lawyer Securities Fraud Attorney Robbery Attorney Accutane Attorney
Birth Injury Attorney Food Poisoning Attorney Prempro Attorney Zyprexa Attorney
Asbestos Attorney Domestic Violence Lawyer Prostitution Attorney Fosamax Attorney
Birth Injury Lawyer Securities Fraud Lawyer Adoption Lawyer Celebrex Lawyer
Mesothelioma Attorney Drug Possession Lawyer Assault Lawyer Benzene Attorney
Aviation Accident Lawyer Identity Theft Attorney Bankruptcy Lawyer Ephedra Attorney
Construction Accident Lawyer Workers Compensation Lawyer Identity Theft Lawyer Dui Lawyer
Medical Malpractice Attorney Workers Compensation Attorney Sexual Assault Lawyer  Prenuptial Lawyer 
Construction Accident Attorney  Wrongful Termination Lawyer Real Estate Lawyer Theft Lawyer
 Wrongful Termination Attorney Immigration Lawyer Arson Attorney
 Nursing Home Abuse Attorney Class Action Lawyer Patent Attorney
Neutral Keywords Intellectual Property Attorney Class Action Attorney Custody Lawyer
Lawsuit Nursing Home Abuse Lawyer  Real Estate Attorney Bextra Attorney
Law Firm Money Laundering Attorney Tenant Attorney Custody Attorney 
Litigation Defective Products Attorney Shoplifting Attorney Vioxx Lawyer
mediation Defective Products Lawyer Bankruptcy Attorney Accutane Lawyer
Attorney Embezzlement Lawyer Family Law Lawyer Vioxx Attorney
Lawyers Credit Card Fraud Attorney Neurontin Attorney Mold Attorney
Lawyer Employment Lawyer Child Abuse Lawyer Mold Lawyer
Attorneys Intellectual Property Lawyer Theft Attorney Paxil Attorney
mediator Insurance Fraud Lawyer Patent Lawyer Alimony Lawyer
legal aid Employment Attorney Contract Lawyer Visa Lawyer
legal help Domestic Violence Attorney Divorce Lawyer Neurontin Lawyer
 Family Law Attorney Forgery Lawyer Paxil Lawyer
 Premises Liability Attorney Oui Lawyer Serzone Lawyer
 Drug Possession Attorney Assault Attorney Tax Attorney
 Traffic Violation Attorney Prostitution Lawyer Visa Attorney
 Estate Planning Attorney Alimony Attorney Divorce Attorney
 Food Poisoning Lawyer Oui Attorney Probate Attorney
 Estate Planning Lawyer Landlord Lawyer Crestor Attorney
 Premises Liability Lawyer Dwi Attorney Dui Attorney
 Toxic Mold Attorney Landlord Attorney Dog Bite Attorney
 Embezzlement Attorney Dwi Lawyer Dog Bite Lawyer
 Immigration Attorney Probate Lawyer  
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Appendix Table 3: Correlation Coefficients for State Laws and State Characteristics  
 
Gross 
state 
product 
per 
capita 
State 
population  
Average 
CPC 
upper 
bound 
Average 
CPC 
lower 
bound 
Presence of 
solicitation 
regulation 
Presence of 
contingency 
fee limit 
Resident 
and 
active 
attorneys 
per dollar 
of state 
GSP 
Total state 
trial-
courts' 
incoming 
civil cases 
per 1000 
population 
GSP per capita 1.00 
State population  -0.05 1.00 
 (0.70) 
Average CPC upper bound -0.12 -0.11 1.00 
(0.42) (0.46) 
Average CPC lower bound 0.34*** 0.30** 0.16 1.00 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.27) 
Solicitation regulation -0.06 0.03 0.07 0.15 1.00 
(0.65) (0.81) (0.63) (0.29) 
Contingency fee limit 0.34*** -0.13 -0.16 -0.05 -0.26* 1.00 
(0.02) (0.37) (0.25) (0.74) (0.07) 
Resident and active attorneys 0.03 0.27* -0.17 -0.09 0.03 0.07 1.00 
(0.84) (0.06) (0.23) (0.53) (0.84) (0.63) 
Civil cases 0.25* 0.03 -0.09 0.10 0.00 -0.16 0.01 1.00 
(0.09) (0.84) (0.56) (0.49) (0.99) (0.27) (0.95) 
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Appendix Table 4: Alternative Robustness Specifications 
 Dependent variable relates to price per click of ranking first Dependent variable is price per click of ranking third 
 
 Tobit with 
missing 
data coded 
as zero 
Tobit with 
missing 
data coded 
as max 
Logged 
price per 
click 
Broader 
definition 
of 
personal 
injury 
keyword 
Only 
neutral 
keywords 
as a 
control 
Tobit with 
missing 
data 
coded as 
zero 
Tobit with 
missing 
data coded 
as max 
Logged 
price per 
click 
Broader 
definition 
of 
personal 
injury 
keyword 
Only 
neutral 
keywords 
as a 
control 
           
Personal Injury Keyword 
and Law restricting 
solicitation 
1.933*** 1.19 0.0490*** 0.792*** 1.205*** 0.823** 0.284 0.0248* 0.609** 1.564***
(0.34) (1.31) (0.012) (0.25) (0.37) (0.34) (1.18) (0.014) (0.26) (0.38) 
Personal Injury Keyword 
and Law restricting 
contingency fees 
-0.486 
(0.54) 
-5.95*** 
(2.05) 
-0.108***
(0.025) 
-2.096*** 
(0.47) 
-2.170*** 
(0.58) 
-1.171** 
(0.58) 
-5.30*** 
(1.84) 
-0.118***
(0.036) 
-1.674*** 
(0.44) 
-2.470***
(0.52) 
Observations 33733 33733 13444 13455 4359 33733 33733 7546 13455 4359
R-squared N/A N/A 0.90 0.84 0.77 N/A N/A 0.95 0.64 0.60 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
All regressions include a full set of dummies for each city and each keyword.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Upper Bound on Price per Click 
 
Figure 2: Lower Bound for Price per Click
 
